28.2 Theory
Existential-dialogical philosophy
can help us make sense of many of the complexities, contradictions and dilemmas
in social welfare. It is within such a context that social workers find
themselves striving to help others, both on the individual and collective
level. Existential philosophy comprises a praxis, reflection and action. As
such, it offers, in my opinion, a basis for social work theory and practice by
constructing a holistic framework which seeks to account for the many facets of
social work.
Kierkegaard (1849/1980) argues that
the self involves a self-relation understood as a relation that relates to
itself. But at the same time, this self-relation is concrete. In the process of
becoming a self, the individual is divided; it is both for and against itself
at the same time. Losing one self (i.e. being without God) is what I understand
Kierkegaard defines as despair, and in my opinion Kierkegaard’s exploration of
despair can be of value in my exploration of the concept and phenomenon of
shame. Healing shame involves becoming oneself again. To become oneself means to come to oneself. A
person becomes a self when the self relates to itself; with the growth of
self-awareness. This perspective is essential in my analysis of the concept of
shame together with Kierkegaard’s existential analysis of the art of helping. Cole
(1971) argues that Kierkegaard’s definition of the self can be paraphrased as
the ego being in a relation which relates the id to the superego. I disagree
with this intrapsychic interpretation of the self of Kierkegaard, and assert that
in reading Sickness unto Death (1849/1980) in tandem with Work
of Love (1847/1995), I see the development of
Kierkegaard’s concept of the social-self.
In Sickness unto Death the
self can be understood as a set of relations, and in Works of Love that what a person does to others also affects the
self. In my opinion, Kierkegaard’s social-self cannot develop without others.
Despair (which I use in relation til shame) develops when this relation to
others is broken (Kierkegaard speaks of one’s relation to God).
Buber’s dialogical philosophy
expands Kierkegaard’s concept of the self in my opinion by demonstrating the
importance of I-Thou dialog instead of I-It monolog. I have chosen to combine
Kierkegaard’s existential philosophy with Buber’s dialogical philosophy in this
dissertation in order to create an Existential-Dialogical
perspective of social work. Buber’s I-Thou dialectic is important because it emphasizes the processes
that arise between persons meeting each other in authentic relations. A dialogical relationship can only exist in a
subject-subject relationship, meaning in an inter-subjective relationship: a
relationship which exists between individuals who view each other as subjects. When
one views another person as an object, an I-It relationship is manifested. Such
a relationship is no longer dialogical, but monological: a relation only with
oneself. An I –It relationship implies that one speaks to the object, rather than with
the object. I-Thou
relationship is genuine because I and Thou addresses each other as subjects.
Thou are no longer objects amongst others; rather, the whole universe is seen
in the light of Thou, and Thou are the light of the universe. Buber (1923/2006)
argues that I-Thou can only be spoken with the whole being; I- It can never be
spoken with the whole being.
This review of the many different theories that include shame has only
been a point of departure and can by no means be considered complete. Both
sociological and psychological theories seem to be important in giving the
concept of shame meaning. I focus on the working concept of shame developed by
Lewis (1971), and the perspective of shame as a self-conscious emotion (Tangney
and Fisher 1995; Tangney and Dearing 2002). Both of these seem to focus on
shame and guilt as emotions that can be evaluated as distinct emotions, which
should be investigated, understood, and treated as such. I also focus on the
emotional-sociological theory developed by Scheff (2003, 2006), which seems to
have a more open understanding of the concept of shame where emotions such as
embarrassment and guilt can be included.
Following Honneth’s theory of
recognition (1996), the core in practical social work should be to contribute
to a successful growth of personal identity. If recognition is the universal condition
for the development of a socially well functioning identity, social work must
in my opinion build on the recognition of the values which the citizens take
upon themselves. The phenomenon of shame studied here has to be contextualized
within the framework of social work practices that are able to handle such
negative identity traits as sexual abuse may leave on people’s life. The
atmosphere allowing narratives of shame to be let out in this research may be
created by the social work practices preceding my entering of the scene.
Honneths forms of recognition and misrecognition may well represent some of the
possible settings we may find these people in.
My point of departure in studying
the concept of shame emphasizes a social view; I am concerned with how shame
manifests itself in social systems. Many definitions of shame emphasize the
psychological aspects of emotions (Tangney and Fischer 1995; Gilbert and
Andrews 1998; Gilbert and Miles 2002). I have chosen to start with a reflection
upon possible conceptual and operational understandings of the concept of shame
which integrate the self (emotional reactions) and society (social bonds), and
choose therefore to define shame as a social-self-conscious emotion. This
underlines that the self is understood as social and intrapsychic, it is also in
the nature of social work to be concerned with both the individual and society.
This double focus, on both self and others, is therefore integral to my choice
of method in exploring the concept of shame.
Kaare T. Pettersen
Reference:
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