How did it come about that at the
same time the Greek city-state culture found itself, conceptual thinking arose
in Greek culture? This conceptual thinking has streamed out over the globe
right down to the present day. We call this kind of thinking for science. And
it started with Euclidean geometry. With precision one could logically prove
things that nobody doubted, yet which nevertheless required the very highest
intellectual effort for their proof. This success in proving represents an
intellectual heroic deed that moved human thought for the first time beyond all
knowledge based on experience (Erfarungswissen) and founded what is now
called science (Wissenschaft). This powerful capacity of reason is truly
a miracle of numbers and geometry that grounds the enormous edifice of
mathematics.
Gadamer and Heidegger as young men |
Plato has shown what this wisdom
consists of, namely knowing about not knowing. It is the manner by which we
seek, to comprehend the other person, the unknown, the not-knowing of our true
place in the world. Gadamer asks how this mathematizing capacity of the Greeks,
this logical power, this taking shape of the most speakable of all languages
manage to gain prominence throughout the world? He says that this question
brings us nearer the theme “word and concept”. Science has taught us more and
more about what a very short episode humanity represents within the evolution
of the universe. Our fate will be decided by how well the world that bears the
stamp of science, and that was philosophically expressed through the world of
concepts, will be able to bring itself into harmony with the equally deep
insights into the destiny of humanity that have come to expression, with
cultures that are completely strange to us.
How have we gotten ourselves in this
situation. Our written heritage dos not start with philosophy but with the
epic. We experience this when see how the concept suddenly began to speak
– speaking suddenly from Greek city-state cultures to the whole Mediterranean
world – when, embedded in the lines of a verse text, it uttered the question, ti
to on – what is being? What is this we call nothingness? Plato`s question
developed out of metaphysics, which through Aristotle finally came to be
accepted throughout the world and left its imprint on two thousand year of
Western thought, until from out of it in the seventeenth century modern science
emerged, as well as the modern sciences of experience and mathematics.
Gadamer reminds us of Hegel who saw
himself faced with the philosophical task of gathering together the new
“sciences” and everything else that did not merge with science, such as
metaphysics and religion, and thereby to raise them up into a unitary whole of
an encompassing concept. The modern sciences of experience, on the one hand, with
their mathematical instrumentalization, and the Socratic thinking that
constantly questions things, on the other, seeking the Good with an attitude of
not-knowing-these are two ways of experiencing reality that do not seem to go
together.
Hegel sought to make persuasive a
reconciliation between the truth of the sciences, the truth of metaphysics, and
that of the Christian religion. For Hegel, this synthesis was not just a matter
of mastering certain areas of knowledge with the help of abstraction and measurement.
It involved those forms of knowing or forms of questioning that do not let
go of us, such as when we stand before works of art or when we touched by
poetic creations.
The “scientific” ideal has
absolutized itself today. One terms the study of law the science of law
and the study of art the science of art. Earlier, the study of art was
called the history of art. The study of literature today is called the science
of literature, when earlier it was called the history of literature. What the
earlier term signified was that from the beginning one assumed that one cannot
“know” literature in the same sense that one obtains “knowledge” through
measurement and mathematics following the model of the natural sciences. A
quite different capacity was required for this kind of knowledge.
Social sciences have certainly
applied mathematical methods in their historically developed forms of
methodical-critical research, but Gadamer believes that they are also guided
and determined by other things: historical models (Vorbilder),
experience, strokes of fate, and in any case by a different kind of exactness
from that in mathematical physics. In the natural sciences one speaks of the
“precision” of mathematizing. But the natural precision attained by the
application of mathematics to living situations ever as great as the precision
attained by the ear of the musician who is tuning his or her instrument finally
reaches a point of satisfaction? Are there not quite different forms of
precision, forms that do not consist in the application of rules or in the use
of an apparatus, but rather in a grasp of what is right that does go beyond
this? But hermeneutics is not a doctrine of methods for the humanities and
social sciences but rather a basic insight into what thinking and knowing
mean for human beings in their practical life, even if one makes use of
scientific methods.
A distinctive capacity is required
in human beings in order for them to make the right use of human knowledge.
Plato asked: What really constitutes the true statesman? A quite specific
talent: a certain instinctive feeling for balance. Plato says there are two
different possible ways of measuring, and both appear to be indispensable. In
the first one, one goes after things with a ruler in order to make them
available and controllable, like the meterruler in Paris that all other metric
measurements must fallow. Here one is clearly concerned with what the Greeks
called poson quantity. The second consists of striking the “right
measure”, finding what is appropriate. We experience this, for example, in the
wonder of harmonious tones sounding together, or in the harmonious feeling of
well-being that we call “health”. This concerns what the Greeks called poion,
quality.
Gadamer has written about illness in
The Enigma of Health. Illness in itself is certainly a threat that one
has to be on guard against. When one becomes ill, a doctor with knowledge and
skill is needed, and one hopes that the doctor can bring it under control.
Health, on the other hand, is clearly something quite different, something we
do not observe or control in the same way. Rather, it is something we follow –
like a path, for example. When we are on this path we have the feeling that now
we are headed in the right direction. The path under our feet becomes a
way.
There are, of course, many other
instances in addition to becoming physically healthy that Gadamer registers as
a clear contrast to the ideal of scientific governance and control. We
understand the term “scientific rigor” (Wissenschaftlichkeit) to mean
objectivity, and it is surely a good thing for us to bring under critical
control the subjective presuppositions that are in play when one observes
anything. Scientific results must in principle be clearly understandable and
repeatable by anyone. This is what makes the idea of objective knowledge
possible. Gadamer finds this fully in order.
One should although not forget what
the word “object” means in German. It means “standing against” (Gegenstand),
that is, resisting (Widerstand). In the sphere of illness and health,
however, we are dealing with a knowing (Wissen) that does not simply
rule over and controls objects. For with regard to health, we cannot simply
reconstruct the way of Nature. Rather, we must be content to break the resistance
of the illness and to help Nature prevail using her own secret way. To do this
requires the art of the doctor to find the right measure.
This is not just science (Wissenschaft)
but rather a different kind of knowing that with its own fulfilment withdraws,
one might say. This is different from art in the creative and formative
arts and also in the literary arts. But one finds something akin to it in how
these arts are carried out, and this marks a kind of boundary between it and
what one associates with the objectivity of science. In medicine as in other
arts one is concerned with much more than the mere applications of rules.
Truth and Method begins with
considerations with art, and not with “science” or even with the human sciences
(die Geistwiaaenschaft). Even within the human sciences it is art
that brings the basic questions of human being to our awareness in such a
unique way – indeed, in such a way that no resistance or objection against it
arises. An artwork is irrefutable. A poem, for example, compels through the way
it says what it says. The poem is. Nobody would ever object to listening to a
recitation by saying that he or she already knew the poem. One must open him-
or herself up to a work of art. If one just claims to be an expert in the field,
who always knows it better, one is like a “philistine”.
In all the sciences Gadamer knows
something about, he says there comes a moment in which something is there,
something one should not forget and cannot forget. This is not a matter of
mastering an area of study. The scientized historical method of understanding
works of pictorial art continues to gain importance in academic circles. This
should not, however, be the only permissible approach. It is Gadamers belief
and hope that a balance between both forms of knowledge is attainable, a
balance that accepts both the scientific and the artistic sides.
Plato also says in the Statesman
that both kinds of measuring are required – the measuring that measures, and
the “right measure” of that one is trying to find. In science one is concerned
with a knowing that breaks down resistance, and only in the end does it require
art (Kunstfertigkeit) rather than science. This second sort of knowing
supports itself, carries within itself a capacity of its own that involves
itself. Gadamer thinks it is not permissible that one form should be the whole
answer: one form of measuring is not more important than the other. Rather,
both forms are important.
Gadamer gives example of this
“miracle of balance” which he himself experienced as a child, learning to ride
a bicycle. He had a somewhat lonely childhood received a bicycle to keep him
occupied. He had to learn to ride it all by himself. There was a little hill in
his backyard, and there is where he tried to teach himself how to ride it. He
climbed up the hill and after a few failed attempts made a great discovery: as
long as he held onto the handlebars as tight as he could, he always tipped
over! But suddenly he stopped this and it happened as if by itself.
We must all create a balance if we
want to steer toward and reach our goals. It is virtually unbelievable that a
little less pressure in holding onto the handlebars, even just a little bit
less, enables one to hold the bicycle in balance and to steer it. But if you
exert just a little to much pressure, then suddenly nothing goes right. Gadamer
applies this experience to all our behaviour, conditioned as it is by modern
forms of life where we are governed by rules, prescriptions, and orders.
It is essential to recognize all the
varied forms of human life and the expressions of their particular worldviews.
In doing so, we find ourselves in the realm of hermeneutics. This is what
Gadamer calls the art of understanding.
But what is understanding?
Understanding, whatever else it may mean, does not entail that one agrees with
whatever or whomever one “understands”. Understanding means that one is able to
weigh and consider fairly what the other person thinks! One recognizes
that the other person could be right in what he og she says or actually wants
to say. Understanding is not just simply mastering something that stands
opposite of oneself, whether it is the other person of the whole
objective world in general. Understanding can of course be understanding in
order to master or control. Man`s will to rule over nature is natural and it
makes our survival possible. Nut it remains true that ruling and the will to
power are not everything.
Understanding always means first of
all: “oh, now I understand what you want!” This does not mean that the other
person is right or that you will be judged to be correct. Only when we
understand another human being will we be able to communicate with one another
at all.
It is easy to claim that humankind today is in
a desperate situation. Human beings threaten to destroy themselves, and
everyone can become aware of this. Gadamer says that while European
civilization has admirably brought to full development the culture of science
with its technical and organizational applications, it has for the past three
centuries neglected the law of balance. Is it not the case in all the questions
we face, that the tasks require a consciousness possessed of far-sightedness
and carefulness, and also an openness to each other, if we are to carry out the
tasks that will shape our future, tasks whose accomplishment is necessary for
peace and reconciliation? Gadamer is of the opinion that with all our technical and scientific progress we
still have not learned well enough how to live with each other and with our own
progress.
Hermeneutics as philosophy is not some kind of
methodological dispute with other sciences, epistemologies, or such things.
Hermeneutics asserts something nobody today can deny: we occupy a moment in
history in which we must strenuously use the full powers of our reason, and not
just keep doing science alone. Without our bringing concepts to speak and
without a common language, we will not be able to find the words that will
reach other persons.
It is true that the way goes “from word to concept”,
but we must also be able to move “from concept to word”, if we wish to reach
the other. Only if we accomplish both will we gain a reasonable understanding
of each other. Only in this way, too, will we possess the possibility of so
holding ourselves back that we can allow the other person`s views to be
recognized. Gadamer believes it is important to become so absorbed in something
that one forgets oneself in it – and this is one of the great blessings of the
experience of art. In the end this is one of the basic conditions for human
beings to be able to live together at all in a human way.
Kaare T. Pettersen
Litteratur:
Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1994). From Word to Concept: The Task of
Hermeneutics as Philosophy, in Bruce Krajewski (red), 2004, Gadamer`s
Repercussions. Reconsidering Philosophical Hermeneutics. Berkely:
University of California Press, p 1-12.
Original title: Vom
Wort zum Begriff. Der Aufgabe der Hermeneutik als Philosophie. Appeared
first in a volume of the Bamberger Hegelwoche series, Odo Marquard (red), 1995,
Menschliche Endlichkeit und Kompensation, Bamberg: Verlag Fränkisher
Tag, p.111-124. The
text dates back to an address given in the Bamberger Hegelwochen of 1994, an
occasion on which Gadamer received an honorary doctorate. This English version
is translated from German by Richard E. Palmer.
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