The Problem of Repetition

The Problem of Repetition

Reflections from a reading of Johansen, Kjell Eyvind (1985). The Problem of Repetition in Søren Kierkegaard. Doctoral dissertation. Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo.

Becoming Through Repetition

I stand at a crossroads, but not merely between two external paths. What I see is an inner situation made visible. On one side, light, continuity, and perhaps the promise of meaning; on the other, fragmentation, uncertainty, and the weight of existence. Yet the decisive point is this: repetition does not lie in choosing one path once and for all, but in continuously becoming the one who walks it.

In this sense, repetition is less about choice as a single act, and more about decision as an ongoing task. The road toward the light is not simply given—it must be repeated into existence through commitment, again and again.

And perhaps that is where my own reading of Kierkegaard becomes most visible here:

the real tension is not between two worlds, but within the individual who must decide—and then remain faithful to that decision in time.

Introductory Reflections

The dissertation is divided into five main chapters. It begins with an examination of the origin of the problem of repetition, followed by discussions of repetition’s ethical solution, repetition as an objective problem, repetition as an ethical-religious project, and finally a chapter addressing doubt, faith, and history. Given the breadth of subtopics, I have chosen in this reconstruction to omit much of what is interesting in order to focus on the core issue: repetition itself.

Having read the dissertation several times and undertaken this reconstruction, I am left with the impression that the concept of repetition itself is not the primary problem. Rather, the difficulty lies in the concretization and operationalization of the concept. At its core, the problem is that of decision. The challenge is not to perform repetition, but to enter into it.

In my view, the dissertation represents a theoretical examination of repetition rather than a repetition in itself. It appears that Johansen relates to the concept without daring to develop a project that could be called a repetition. This may seem a strong claim, yet I would argue that although repetition is treated as an ethical-religious project, the project ultimately collapses due to its one-sided epistemological focus. A “project” ought to be understood as a concept expressing philosophy’s practical interest.

John Lundstøl’s master’s thesis The Autonomous Human Being (1970), in contrast, may be seen as an example of repetition. His work, and the existential consequences he draws from his decision, are imbued with the seriousness of existence. Repetition is not an epistemological category, but a category of will and continuity. Lundstøl, unlike Johansen, wills repetition and has matured—both as a human being and as a philosopher—through existential seriousness.

Introduction

In De omnibus dubitandum est, it is stated that repetition becomes possible only when a relation between ideality (concept, idea) and reality (empirical existence) has been established. Kierkegaard employs the concept in the sense that something which has previously occurred or been done now occurs or is done again.

However, the original meaning of the concept is found in Plato’s doctrine of anamnesis: that knowledge is recollection. In recollection, a given reality is traced back to a presupposed ideality. This doctrine is not merely an epistemology, but also a teaching about the soul’s longing, its goal, its passion, and its model. Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author Constantin Constantius calls recollection a “backward repetition.”

Repetition, especially within the ethical-religious domain, is marked by conflict—a conflict between the individual who seeks at all costs to realize the ideal and the surrounding world. In this context, despair also plays a role, as the individual who lives with awareness of the ideal must confront an insufficient self—or more precisely, a self that relates to itself as insufficient. Johansen is not concerned with reconciliation but with the many forms this conflict assumes.

Repetition in Kierkegaard consists of ironic allusions to the suffering of the passionate individual. Its meaning therefore varies according to the character and direction of passion—whether aesthetic, ethical, or religious. The pseudonymous authors approach repetition from different premises, and consequently their interpretations vary.

Although Kierkegaard employs multiple pseudonyms, they are not entirely independent perspectives. Rather, a developmental trajectory can be discerned. The Danish theologian Johannes Sløk argues that the unifying idea in Kierkegaard’s authorship is not a constant X, but a transcendental point beyond it. Kierkegaard emphasized that the task of life is to maintain continuity amid change. Johansen, however, treats decision as the central thematic constant.

The Origin of the Problem

The problem of repetition arises when an individual seeks to actualize an ideal—not merely to imagine it aesthetically, but to bring it into reality. Repetition belongs to the relation between the aesthetic and the ethical.

Several of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authors emphasize that repetition is a task. Vigilius Haufniensis writes:

“The task is to transform repetition into inwardness, into freedom’s own task, its highest interest: whether, while everything changes, it can realize repetition.”

Wilhelm, the Assessor, maintains that the task is to preserve love in time:

“However you twist and turn it, you must admit that the task is to preserve love in time. If this is impossible, then love itself is impossible.”

The aesthete’s limitation lies in the disappearance of pleasure. Once pleasure fades, the aesthete withdraws. The aesthetic dimension represents the individual’s immediate self. While all individuals possess aesthetic conditions, the aesthete has not established a free relation to this dimension. From the ethical perspective, all aesthetic life-views are forms of despair.

The ethical individual asserts that human beings possess an inherent drive toward becoming conscious of themselves as spiritual beings. If this development is halted, melancholy arises—what Kierkegaard describes as “the hysteria of the spirit.”

Repetition and Freedom

Freedom relates to repetition on three levels:

1. Freedom is experienced as pleasure; repetition is feared.
2. Through prudence, the individual learns limitation but remains trapped.
3. Repetition becomes freedom’s ally; the individual makes repetition the task.

At the highest level, freedom itself becomes repetition. The problem then emerges: is repetition possible?

Decision and Existence

Descartes advocated universal doubt, but Kierkegaard’s ethicist recommends despair. Through despair, one discovers the eternal self. Once freedom is established, the task becomes repetition—not preserving freedom in aesthetic detachment, but realizing it through ethical action.

Kierkegaard increasingly emphasizes the suffering of the individual who seeks to realize ethical and religious ideals.

The decisive difference between Hegel and Kierkegaard lies in decision. For Kierkegaard, the task of the subjective thinker is to realize the idea in existence.

Repetition as an Objective Problem

Kierkegaard distinguishes between empirical and non-empirical knowledge, and between ordinary faith and faith in its eminent sense.

Scientific knowledge concerns what is necessary and unchanging. Logic, mathematics, and metaphysics fall into this category. Existence, however, is anti-speculative—it is the medium in which the synthesis must be realized.

For Kierkegaard, the starting point of thought is hypothetical. The absolute is not found in thought, but in the passionate decision to commit oneself to an idea.

Hegel’s philosophy, as interpreted by Charles Taylor, describes self-realization through contradiction. The subject must overcome itself to achieve unity within a higher rational whole.

Kierkegaard, however, insists that such unity cannot be realized in existence. As long as one exists, one exists in contradiction. Identity is a horizon, never fully attained.

Faith, Contradiction, and Repetition

The connection between ideality and reality cannot be resolved through knowledge alone. Plato resolves this through recollection, but Kierkegaard introduces faith as the connecting link.

Subjective truth is defined as:

“Objective uncertainty, held fast in the most passionate inward appropriation, is truth.”

Continuity in human life cannot be achieved through imagination or reflection. It must be realized through repetition.

In Repetition, Constantin Constantius distinguishes between recollection (backward repetition) and repetition proper (forward movement). Repetition “forward” is the ethical realization of an idea through action.

Repetition, Despair, and Faith

In The Sickness Unto Death, despair is defined as the refusal to be oneself or the desperate will to be oneself. Stoicism represents a highly developed form of despair—self-sufficiency without grounding.

Repetition requires continuity. The aesthete lacks this continuity and therefore cannot realize repetition.

The transition to the ethical requires a decisive choice: to will oneself. Repetition becomes the realization of this decision.

The Religious Dimension

Repetition ultimately requires faith. In Fear and Trembling, faith is described as a double movement: infinite resignation and belief in the absurd.

Abraham embodies this paradox. He relinquishes his son, yet believes he will receive him again. Faith thus becomes the condition for repetition.

The task of existence is to unite the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal. This synthesis cannot be fully grasped empirically. Repetition becomes possible only through faith and love.

A concluding remark: Repetition as Existential Responsibility

In conclusion, the problem of repetition, as it emerges in Kierkegaard’s authorship and in Johansen’s reconstruction, cannot be resolved at the level of conceptual clarification alone. Repetition is not primarily a theoretical problem, but an existential task. It concerns the individual’s capacity to enter into continuity with oneself through decision, action, and perseverance.

This is precisely where the connection to practical philosophy becomes evident. Practical philosophy is not concerned with knowledge as such, but with how knowledge becomes lived. In this sense, repetition expresses the movement through which an individual seeks to embody an ideal within the changing conditions of existence. It is the ongoing effort to remain faithful to what one has chosen to be.

Thus, repetition may be understood as the ethical form of continuity: the sustained realization of a decision in time. It is here that philosophy moves from reflection to life—from understanding what is good, to becoming responsible for it.

References

Hannay, A. (1982). Kierkegaard. London: Routledge.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1807/1977). Phenomenology of Spirit (A. V. Miller, Trans.). Oxford University Press.

Johansen, K. E. (1985). Gjentagelsens problem hos Søren Kierkegaard (Doctoral dissertation). University of Oslo.

Kierkegaard, S. (1843/1983). Fear and Trembling (H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong, Trans.). Princeton University Press.

Kierkegaard, S. (1843/1983). Repetition (H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong, Trans.). Princeton University Press.

Kierkegaard, S. (1843–1846). Either/Or (Vols. I–II). Princeton University Press.

Kierkegaard, S. (1849/1980). The Sickness Unto Death. Princeton University Press.

Kierkegaard, S. (1844/1980). The Concept of Anxiety. Princeton University Press.

Kierkegaard, S. (1846/1992). Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Princeton University Press.

Løgstrup, K. E. (1968). Oppgjør med Kierkegaard. Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

Lundstøl, J. (1970). Det myndige menneske. Oslo: Gyldendal.

Sløk, J. (1954). Die Anthropologie Kierkegaards. Copenhagen.

Taylor, C. (1978). Hegel. Cambridge University Press.

The text here is written by me.