Saturday, April 25, 2026

The Loneliness of the Dying in an Age That Fears Silence

 

The Loneliness of the Dying in an Age That Fears Silence

In "conversation" with Norbert Elias

There are books that inform us, and there are books that wait for us until we are old enough to understand them.

Norbert Elias wrote one such book in The Loneliness of the Dying. It is a short work, but not a small one. Some books are measured in pages; others in depth. Elias offers no sentimental consolations, no dramatic theology, no fashionable self-help. Instead, he places before us a mirror and asks whether modern civilization, for all its triumphs, has forgotten how to remain human in the presence of death.

That question grows larger with age.

When we are young, death belongs mostly to statistics, history books, and the misfortunes of others. It is something that happens elsewhere. In later life, it moves closer. It begins to wear familiar faces. A parent’s silence. A friend’s empty chair. A name once often spoken, now spoken carefully. Then death is no longer merely an idea. It becomes part of the landscape of memory.

And when that happens, philosophy itself changes. It becomes less interested in systems, and more interested in kindness.


The Loneliness of the Dying


A Civilization of Mastery

We live in an age of remarkable power. We can transplant organs, prolong life, reduce pain, map genes, predict disease, and monitor the hidden workings of the body with astonishing precision. Earlier generations would have regarded much of this as miraculous.

Yet Elias asks us to notice another side of progress.

We have learned to postpone death, disinfect death, regulate death, and organize death. But have we also made death lonelier?

That is not an accusation. It is a question worthy of honest reflection.

For many centuries, death was woven into ordinary life. People often died at home. Children saw aging. Families gathered. Neighbors entered quietly. Rituals were shared. The body of the dead remained present for a time. Grief belonged not only to the individual heart, but to the community.

Today death has largely moved behind closed doors. It often takes place in hospitals, institutions, or specialized settings managed by professionals. Bodies disappear quickly and efficiently. Procedures replace older rituals. Much suffering has been reduced through medicine, and this should never be dismissed. But something else may have been diminished: familiarity, courage, and companionship.

We have hidden death so successfully that many no longer know how to meet it.


The Embarrassment of the Living

One of Elias’s deepest insights is that the problem of death belongs largely to the living.

The dying person often knows what is happening. The body knows. Time knows. Silence knows.

But the living become uncertain.

What shall we say?
How cheerful should we be?
Should we mention the truth?
Should we pretend?
How long should we stay?
Is it better to speak—or to say nothing?

So we hesitate. We become formal. We discuss practical matters. We speak too brightly. We retreat into medical updates. We promise to visit again “soon.” Sometimes we stay away because we cannot bear our own helplessness.

This is rarely lack of love. Often it is love mixed with fear.

Many have experienced such rooms. Machines hum steadily. Curtains move slightly. Someone glances at a clock. Someone checks a phone. A hand lies still on the blanket, waiting not for solutions, but for touch.

Modern people are often highly educated in technology and strangely undereducated in mortality.

The Discipline of Self-Control

Elias spent much of his life studying the long civilizing process by which societies cultivated manners, restraint, foresight, and emotional regulation. These achievements matter. Without them, life can become brutal and chaotic.

Yet every gain casts a shadow.

A culture that values control may become hesitant before strong feeling. A society trained in efficiency may become impatient with slowness. A people accustomed to privacy may lose the language of shared sorrow.

We know how to schedule appointments.
We know how to sanitize surfaces.
We know how to optimize systems.
But do we still know how to sit beside suffering without fleeing inwardly?

This question reaches far beyond the hospital ward. It concerns friendship, marriage, parenting, aging, and the fate of public life itself.

Where strong feeling becomes embarrassing, tenderness often grows timid.


What Children Already Know

Elias also observed the modern tendency to conceal death from children. Adults often imagine they are protecting innocence when in truth they may be protecting themselves.

We say:

“Grandfather is sleeping.”
“She has gone away.”
“He is watching over us.”
“Don’t ask that now.”

Children, however, live close to reality. They notice absence. They sense tears. They hear tones of voice. They ask direct questions because they have not yet learned adult evasions.

Will you die?
Will I die?
Where is she now?
Why is everyone whispering?

The danger does not lie in children learning that life is finite. The danger lies in confusing them through secrecy, contradiction, or panic.

Truth given gently is often kinder than fiction given nervously.

A wise culture introduces mortality gradually, honestly, and without melodrama. To do so is not morbid. It is part of forming a human being capable of meeting life as it is.


Fear of Death, or Fear of Unlived Life?

Much fear surrounding death is not biological fear alone. It is existential fear.

We fear losing what matters before it has flowered.

Words not spoken.
Love not confessed.
Forgiveness postponed.
Work left unfinished.
A self never fully inhabited.

Here Elias quietly meets Søren Kierkegaard, who knew that despair may consist in not becoming oneself. He also meets Martin Heidegger, who insisted that human life gains seriousness because it is finite. And he meets Martin Buber, who would ask whether we still know how to meet one another not as objects to manage, but as persons to encounter.

Death exposes the truth of how we have lived.

If we have lived only outwardly, death may appear as theft.
If we have loved deeply, it may still be painful—but not meaningless.
If we have delayed everything essential, death can feel like accusation.
If we have been present, it may feel more like completion.

No philosophy can remove sorrow. But philosophy may help us distinguish fear of dying from fear of never having truly lived.


Meaning Is Not a Private Possession

Modern people often search for meaning as if it were hidden somewhere inside the solitary self, waiting to be discovered like a lost object.

Elias reminds us otherwise. Meaning is relational. It grows between people, through tasks, commitments, memory, language, responsibility, and shared life.

A meaningful life may consist less in dramatic achievement than in faithful presence.

To raise a child well.
To comfort a frightened person.
To build something useful.
To remain loyal when convenience invites departure.
To bring humor into heavy rooms.
To keep one’s word.
To love imperfectly, but sincerely.

Many who seem ordinary in public memory were extraordinary in the private economy of goodness.

And many who die peacefully do so not because every question was answered, but because they know they belonged somewhere and mattered to someone.


What the Elderly Teach the Rest of Us

There is a temptation in productive societies to value people mainly for output. Those who slow down risk becoming invisible.

This is a moral failure.

The elderly often carry what no algorithm can store: long memory, proportion, patience, stories, reconciled sorrow, and a more sober understanding of what matters. They know that many urgent matters were never important, and many neglected matters were essential.

When societies exile the old emotionally, they do not merely fail the elderly. They impoverish themselves.

The one who walks slowly may still know the road.

Presence as Practical Wisdom

My own concern has long been practical philosophy—not philosophy as ornament, but philosophy as guidance for living.

In that spirit, the loneliness of the dying cannot be solved by theory alone. It is met through character.

Sometimes we cannot cure.
Sometimes we cannot explain.
Sometimes we cannot promise recovery.
But we can remain.

To remain is not a small thing.

A chair drawn close to the bed.
Water offered slowly.
A remembered story retold.
Silence shared without panic.
A hand held without words.

Such gestures may appear modest beside the achievements of modern medicine. Yet for the person who is dying, they can mean everything.

Presence is one of the highest forms of intelligence.


The Courage to Reconcile Early

Death also teaches urgency.

Do not wait for hospital corridors to say what should have been said years earlier.

Thank sooner.
Forgive sooner.
Ask forgiveness sooner.
Visit sooner.
Love sooner.

Many imagine that wisdom arrives dramatically near the end. More often wisdom consists in ordinary things done in time.


A More Hopeful Civilization

Elias diagnoses loneliness, but diagnosis is not destiny.

Cultures can learn. Families can change. Institutions can humanize themselves. Caregivers around the world already embody another possibility every day: competence joined with compassion, discipline joined with warmth.

The finest nurse may teach more philosophy in one night shift than many professors in a semester.

The finest daughter keeping watch through the night may reveal more about civilization than political speeches.

The finest friend who dares to visit when others disappear may restore the dignity of the world.


A Personal Word

At a certain age, one reads books differently. I no longer read only to gather ideas. I read to recognize truths.

I have seen rooms where machines made more sound than people. I have seen how difficult silence can be for the living. I have also seen moments of astonishing grace: a gentle hand, a smile through tears, an old joke remembered at the edge of life.

These moments do not remove death. They redeem something within it.

Morning light becomes dearer with age. So does kindness.


Closing Reflection

Norbert Elias reminds us that progress alone is not wisdom.

A society may become cleaner, safer, richer, longer-lived, and technically brilliant—yet still fail at the simplest human task: to accompany one another faithfully when nothing more can be fixed.

Perhaps the measure of civilization is not only how people live.

Perhaps it is also whether anyone dares to remain beside them when they die.

Practical philosophy begins there.

Not in abstraction.
Not in systems.
Not in grand declarations.

But in honesty.
In courage.
In tenderness.
In presence.

And sometimes, in the quiet dignity of staying.


References

Buber, M. (1970). I and thou (W. Kaufmann, Trans.). Scribner. (Original work published 1923).

Elias, N. (1985). The loneliness of the dying. Continuum. (Original work published 1982).

Elias, N. (2000). The civilizing process. Blackwell. (Original work published 1939).

Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Harper & Row. (Original work published 1927).

Kierkegaard, S. (1980). The sickness unto death (H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong, Trans.). Princeton University Press.



The text is mine and OpenAI/ChatGPT helped me with the illustration

Thomas Aquinas: Om det gode, det høyeste gode – og hvorfor dette fortsatt angår oss

 

Heidegger leser Thomas Aquinas: Om det gode, det høyeste gode – og hvorfor dette fortsatt angår oss

Jeg sitter med bind 23 av Martin Heideggers Gesamtausgabe. En bok som følger filosofiens utvikling fra middelalderen til Immanuel Kant. Når Thomas Aquinas trer frem i disse forelesningene, skjer det noe interessant. Her møter vi ikke bare en middelalderteolog med støvete begreper. Vi møter en tenker som stiller et spørsmål som fortsatt er levende:

Hva er det gode – og finnes det et høyeste gode som kan orientere menneskelivet?

Dette spørsmålet er ikke gammelt. Det er dagligdags. Det lever i hjem, i politikk, i helsevesen, i barnevern, i kjærlighet, i alderdom og i våre indre kamper. Når vi spør: Hva bør jeg gjøre? Hva er rett? Hva gir livet retning? – da står vi fortsatt i skyggen av Thomas Aquinas.

Og når Martin Heidegger leser ham, gjør han noe mer enn å forklare historien. Han forsøker å avdekke hvordan selve forståelsen av væren, verdi og menneske ble formet.


Thomas Aquinas og spørsmålet om det gode

I Summa Theologiae, Quaestio 5 – De bono in communi – drøfter Thomas Aquinas hva “det gode” betyr i alminnelighet. Hans grunnidé er enkel og samtidig dyp:

Det gode er det som alle ting streber etter.

Dette er en tanke han arver fra Aristotle. Ethvert vesen søker sin fullbyrdelse. Frøet søker å bli tre. Barnet søker modning. Mennesket søker sannhet, kjærlighet, mening og lykke.

For Thomas Aquinas er det gode ikke først og fremst en moralsk etikett. Det gode er knyttet til væren, til oppfyllelse, til det som fullender noe i samsvar med dets natur.

Et godt øye ser.
Et godt vennskap bærer.
Et godt samfunn fremmer rettferdighet.
Et godt menneskeliv modnes i sannhet og kjærlighet.

Her finnes en visdom vi lett mister i vår tid. Vi gjør ofte det gode til smak, preferanse eller politisk standpunkt. Men for Thomas Aquinas har det gode struktur. Det er forbundet med hva noe er, og hva det kan bli når det blomstrer.


Heidegger ser mer enn teologi

Når Martin Heidegger leser middelaldertenkere, leter han ikke bare etter religiøse læresetninger. Han leter etter hvordan vestlig tenkning om væren utviklet seg.

For ham er Thomas Aquinas avgjørende fordi han sammenføyer kristen teologi med gresk metafysikk, særlig Aristotle. Resultatet blir et stort system hvor verden forstås hierarkisk, ordnet, målrettet.

Ting har essens.
Mennesket har formål.
Moralen har grunnlag.
Gud er det høyeste gode.

For Heidegger er dette både storhet og begynnelsen på et problem. Storhet fordi tenkningen søker helhet. Problem fordi væren gradvis forstås som noe tilstedeværende, ordnet og tilgjengelig for begrepsmessig kontroll.

Det vil si: vi går fra undring over at noe er, til systemer over hva ting er.

Dette er et mønster som fortsetter inn i moderniteten.


Det høyeste gode – summum bonum

Hos Thomas Aquinas finnes ikke bare mange goder, men også et høyeste godesummum bonum. Alle delgoder peker utover seg selv.

Penger er ikke nok.
Nytelse er ikke nok.
Anerkjennelse er ikke nok.
Makten er ikke nok.

Mennesket søker noe mer varig og fullstendig. For Aquinas er dette den salige forening med Gud, hvor sannhet og kjærlighet fullendes.

Mange moderne mennesker vil ikke formulere det teologisk. Likevel lever spørsmålet videre:

Hva er det største gode i et menneskeliv?

Er det frihet?
Er det kjærlighet?
Er det verdighet?
Er det indre fred?
Er det å tjene noe større enn seg selv?

Vi lever ofte som om spørsmålet ikke finnes. Men våre valg røper hva vi egentlig tror.



Praktisk filosofi begynner her

For meg er praktisk filosofi ikke først og fremst teori. Det er kunsten å leve mer bevisst. Å velge og å ta ansvar for det gode.

Derfor er Thomas Aquinas høyst aktuell.

Når et menneske spør:

  • Skal jeg si sannheten eller beskytte noen?
  • Skal jeg forlate et arbeid som tømmer meg?
  • Hvordan møte et barn i smerte?
  • Hva skylder jeg gamle foreldre?
  • Hvordan leve med anger?
  • Hva er et godt liv når kroppen svekkes?

Da hjelper det lite med slagord. Da trenger vi en dypere forståelse av goder, rangorden mellom goder og menneskelig modning.

Det er nettopp dette Aquinas arbeider med.


Mange goder kolliderer

Et av vår tids største problemer er ikke mangel på valg, men for mange valg uten rangorden.

Vi har:

  • effektivitet
  • frihet
  • trygghet
  • nytelse
  • selvrealisering
  • lojalitet
  • omsorg
  • økonomi
  • sannhet
  • fellesskap

Alle disse kan være goder. Men de kan også komme i konflikt.

Skal sykepleieren bruke mer tid på mennesket eller følge tidsplanen?
Skal læreren være snill eller stille krav?
Skal forelderen beskytte eller slippe fri?
Skal forskeren tie for karrieren eller tale sant?

Thomas Aquinas minner oss om at ikke alle goder er like grunnleggende. Noen er midler. Andre er mål.

Dette er en uvurderlig innsikt i en tid hvor alt lett blandes sammen.


Heidegger ville spørre dypere

Men Heidegger ville ikke stoppe der. Han ville spørre:

Hvordan er mennesket selv slik at spørsmålet om det gode kan oppstå?

For Heidegger er mennesket et vesen som står åpent mot væren, kastet inn i tid, dødelighet og ansvar. Vi er ikke bare skapninger med mål. Vi er også skapninger som kan gå oss vill, skjule oss, leve uegentlig.

Der Aquinas søker orden, fremhever Heidegger ofte uro.
Der Aquinas taler om natur, taler Heidegger om eksistens.
Der Aquinas peker oppover, peker Heidegger innover og fremover.

Begge trengs.

For uten orden blir livet kaos.
Uten eksistensiell alvor blir orden tom.


Det gode i helsevesen og omsorg

La oss gå helt ned på bakken.

En eldre mann med demens nekter å dusje. Personalet har dårlig tid.

Hva er det gode?

Effektivitet sier: få det gjort.
Regelverk sier: rutinen må følges.
Omsorg sier: møt frykten først.
Verdighet sier: han er ikke et objekt.

Her trenger vi praktisk dømmekraft, det Aristotle kalte phronesis.

Thomas Aquinas viderefører mye av denne tradisjonen: Det gode er ikke bare abstrakt; det må virkeliggjøres klokt i situasjonen.

Og Heidegger minner oss om at mennesket foran oss er et værende med sin egen verden, angst, historie og sårbarhet.

Dette er praktisk filosofi i arbeidstøy.


Det gode i barnevern og sosialt arbeid

Jeg kjenner selv hvor vanskelig dette feltet er. Der kolliderer goder daglig.

Barnets trygghet.
Foreldres rettigheter.
Sannhetens usikkerhet.
Tidspress.
Juridiske krav.
Menneskelig smerte.

Den som tror slike felt kan styres av manualer alene, har ikke stått i virkeligheten.

Her er Aquinas nyttig fordi han minner oss om at menneskeliv har iboende verdighet og mål. Barnet er ikke bare sak. Familien er ikke bare mappe.

Her er Heidegger nyttig fordi han minner oss om hvordan systemer kan dekke over menneskets konkrete væren.

Det gode må alltid gjenfinnes i møtet.


Forbrukersamfunnet og de små goder

Vår tid tilbyr tusen små goder og skjuler de store.

Mer underholdning.
Mer scrolling.
Mer kjøpekraft.
Mer stimuli.

Men mennesker kan eie mer og mangle mening. Vi kan være koblet til alt og fremmed for oss selv.

Thomas Aquinas ville si at vi forveksler midler med mål.
Heidegger ville si at vi er fanget i det han senere kaller Gestell – en innramming hvor alt blir ressurser, også oss selv.

Vi optimaliserer søvn, kropp, produktivitet og nettverk – men glemmer å spørre hvorfor.

Det er et farlig tap.


Det høyeste gode uten religiøst språk?

Må man tro på Gud for å lære av Aquinas?

Nei. Ikke nødvendigvis.

Man kan lese ham sekulært som påminnelse om at menneskelivet trenger et orienterende sentrum. Et “høyeste gode” kan forstås som det som gir helhet og retning.

For noen er det Gud.
For andre sannhet.
For andre nestekjærlighet.
For andre ansvar.
For andre det å leve ærlig.

Spørsmålet er ikke først hva du kaller det. Spørsmålet er om du lever uten noe høyere enn øyeblikkets drift.


Heidegger og samvittighetens kall

Heidegger skriver i Væren og tid om samvittighetens kall. Ikke som moralsk pekefinger, men som et stille kall tilbake til et mer ekte liv.

Det er interessant å lese dette sammen med Aquinas.

Hos Aquinas finnes orden og mål.
Hos Heidegger finnes kallet og oppvåkningen.

Kanskje trenger vår tid begge deler:

  • et språk for det gode
  • et kall til å leve det


Når livet bryter sammen

Hva da når sykdom, sorg eller tap gjør “det gode liv” umulig?

Her må enhver filosofi prøves.

En enke mister sin livspartner.
En mann får kreft.
Et barn dør.
En gammel kvinne blir ensom.

Da virker teorier små.

Likevel kan noe bestå:

godhet i møte
trofasthet
nærvær
sannhet uten pynt
mot til å bære dagen

Kanskje det høyeste gode noen ganger ikke er triumf, men kjærlighet som holder stand i mørket.

Her møter Aquinas og eksistensfilosofien hverandre mer enn vi tror.


Hva kan vi lære i dag?

Fra Thomas Aquinas:

  1. Det gode er mer enn smak.
  2. Menneskelivet har retning og formål.
  3. Ikke alle goder er like viktige.
  4. Dyd og karakter betyr noe.

Fra Heidegger:

  1. Mennesket lever i tid og sårbarhet.
  2. Systemer kan skjule det vesentlige.
  3. Vi kan miste oss selv i hverdagen.
  4. Samvittighet og oppvåkning er nødvendig.

Fra praktisk filosofi:

  1. Tanker må bli liv.
  2. Det gode avgjøres ofte i små handlinger.
  3. Dømmekraft er viktigere enn slagord.
  4. Ansvar kan ikke outsources.


Min egen tanke ved lesningen

Når jeg leser disse gamle tekstene, slår det meg hvor moderne vi er – og hvor fattige vi ofte tenker.

Vi har data om alt, men visdom om lite.
Vi måler trivsel, men forstår ikke sjelen.
Vi diskuterer verdier, men sjelden det gode.

Kanskje trenger vi ikke mindre filosofi, men mer. Ikke mer akademisk pynt, men mer livsnær tenkning.

Å lese Heidegger lese Thomas Aquinas er derfor ikke antiquarisk arbeid. Det er å hente frem spørsmål vi fortsatt lever av.


Avslutning

Hva er det gode?

Spørsmålet kommer tilbake når vi minst venter det. Ved sykesengen. I skilsmissen. I oppdragelsen. I stillheten etter et hardt ord. I morgengryet når et menneske kjenner at livet må leves sannere.

Thomas Aquinas minner oss om at mennesket søker fullbyrdelse.
Heidegger minner oss om at vi kan gå oss vill.

Praktisk filosofi begynner når vi tar begge innsikter alvorlig.

Ikke ved å snakke mest om det gode.
Men ved å velge det.
I det små.
I det vanskelige.
I dag.


Referanser

Aquinas, T. (1947). Summa theologica (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Trans.). Benziger Bros. (Original work published 1265–1274)

Aristotle. (2009). Den nikomakiske etikk (Ø. Rabbås & A. Stigen, Overs.). Vidarforlaget.

Heidegger, M. (1978). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Blackwell. (Original work published 1927)

Heidegger, M. (2006). Gesamtausgabe Band 23: Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis Kant. Vittorio Klostermann.

MacIntyre, A. (2007). After virtue (3rd ed.). University of Notre Dame Press.

Pieper, J. (1966). The four cardinal virtues. University of Notre Dame Press.

Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self. Harvard University Press.



Tekst og illustrasjon er skapt i samtale med OpenAI/ChatGTP

Thomas Aquinas: The Good, the Highest Good – and Why It Still Matters

 

Heidegger Reading Thomas Aquinas: The Good, the Highest Good – and Why It Still Matters

I am currently reading Volume 23 of Martin Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe. The book traces the development of philosophy from Thomas Aquinas to Immanuel Kant. When Aquinas appears in these lectures, something important happens. We do not merely meet a medieval theologian surrounded by old concepts. We meet a thinker asking a question that remains fully alive:

What is the good—and is there a highest good capable of orienting human life?

This is not an outdated question. It lives in homes, politics, healthcare, education, aging, love, grief, and in our private moral struggles. Whenever we ask, What should I do? What is right? What gives life direction?—we are still standing in the shadow of Thomas Aquinas.

And when Martin Heidegger reads Aquinas, he does more than explain intellectual history. He tries to uncover how Western thought itself came to understand being, value, and the human person.


Thomas Aquinas and the Question of the Good

In Summa Theologiae, Question 5 – De bono in communi (“On the Good in General”) – Thomas Aquinas asks what “the good” means in its broadest sense. His central claim is both simple and profound:

The good is that which all things desire.

This idea comes partly from Aristotle. Every being seeks its fulfillment. A seed seeks to become a tree. A child seeks maturity. Human beings seek truth, love, meaning, and happiness.

For Aquinas, the good is not first of all a moral label. It is connected to being, flourishing, and the completion of something according to its nature.

A good eye sees.
A good friendship endures.
A good society promotes justice.
A good human life matures in truth and love.

There is wisdom here that modern life often forgets. We tend to reduce the good to preference, lifestyle, ideology, or opinion. But for Aquinas, the good has structure. It is linked to what something is, and what it can become when it flourishes.


Heidegger Sees More Than Theology

When Martin Heidegger reads medieval thinkers, he is not only searching for religious doctrines. He is looking for how Western metaphysics developed.

For him, Thomas Aquinas is decisive because he joins Christian theology with Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle. The result is a grand vision of reality as ordered, meaningful, and purposive.

Things have essences.
Human beings have ends.
Morality has foundations.
God is the highest good.

For Heidegger, this is both a great achievement and the beginning of a problem. A great achievement because it seeks wholeness. A problem because being gradually becomes understood as something fixed, present, and available for conceptual control.

We move from wonder that things are, toward systems explaining what things are.

That movement continues into modernity.


The Highest Good – Summum Bonum

For Thomas Aquinas there are many goods, but also a highest goodsummum bonum. Lesser goods point beyond themselves.

Money is not enough.
Pleasure is not enough.
Recognition is not enough.
Power is not enough.

Human beings seek something more complete and enduring. For Aquinas, this fulfillment is union with God, where truth and love reach their completion.

Many modern people would not frame the matter religiously. Yet the question remains:

What is the greatest good in a human life?

Is it freedom?
Love?
Dignity?
Inner peace?
Service to something larger than oneself?

We often live as if the question does not exist. But our choices reveal what we truly believe.



Practical philosophy begins here

For me, practical philosophy is not primarily theory. It is the art of living more consciously—of choosing and taking responsibility for the good.

That is why Thomas Aquinas remains so relevant.

When a person asks:

  • Should I tell the truth or protect someone?
  • Should I leave work that is draining my soul?
  • How do I meet a suffering child?
  • What do I owe aging parents?
  • How do I live with regret?
  • What is a good life when the body weakens?

Slogans are of little help. We need a deeper understanding of goods, their order, and human maturity.

That is exactly the terrain Aquinas explores.


When Goods Collide

One of the greatest problems of modern life is not lack of choices, but too many choices without an order of importance.

We value:

  • efficiency
  • freedom
  • security
  • pleasure
  • self-realization
  • loyalty
  • care
  • wealth
  • truth
  • community

All of these may be genuine goods. But they often conflict.

Should the nurse spend more time with the patient or keep to the schedule?
Should the teacher be kind or demanding?
Should the parent protect or let go?
Should the researcher stay silent for career safety or speak honestly?

Thomas Aquinas reminds us that not all goods are equally fundamental. Some are means. Others are ends.

This is a precious insight in an age where everything easily becomes confused.


Heidegger Would Ask More Deeply

Yet Heidegger would not stop there. He would ask:

What kind of being is the human person, such that the question of the good can arise at all?

For Heidegger, the human being stands open to being itself, thrown into time, mortality, responsibility, and uncertainty. We are not merely creatures pursuing goals. We are beings capable of losing ourselves, hiding from ourselves, and living inauthentically.

Where Aquinas emphasizes order, Heidegger emphasizes unrest.
Where Aquinas speaks of nature, Heidegger speaks of existence.
Where Aquinas points upward, Heidegger often points inward and forward.

Both are needed.

Without order, life becomes chaos.
Without existential seriousness, order becomes empty.


The Good in Healthcare and Caregiving

Let us come down to earth.

An elderly man with dementia refuses to shower. The staff are under time pressure.

What is the good here?

Efficiency says: get it done.
Procedure says: follow the routine.
Care says: meet the fear first.
Dignity says: he is not an object.

Here we need practical judgment—what Aristotle called phronesis.

Thomas Aquinas continues this tradition: the good is not merely abstract; it must be wisely enacted in concrete situations.

And Heidegger reminds us that the person before us is a being with a world, a history, anxieties, and vulnerability.

This is practical philosophy in working clothes.


The Good in Social Work and Child Protection

I know how difficult this field can be. Goods collide there every day.

The child’s safety.
Parental rights.
Uncertain truth.
Time pressure.
Legal demands.
Human pain.

Anyone who thinks such realities can be governed by manuals alone has not stood in real life.

Aquinas helps because he reminds us that human life has inherent dignity and purpose. A child is not a case file. A family is not paperwork.

Heidegger helps because he reminds us how systems can conceal the concrete reality of the human person.

The good must always be rediscovered in the encounter.


Consumer Society and the Smaller Goods

Our age offers countless smaller goods while hiding the greater ones.

More entertainment.
More scrolling.
More purchasing power.
More stimulation.

Yet people may own more and possess less meaning. We may be connected to everything and estranged from ourselves.

Thomas Aquinas would say we confuse means with ends.
Heidegger would say we are trapped in what he later calls Gestell—a framework in which everything becomes a resource, including ourselves.

We optimize sleep, productivity, bodies, and networks—yet forget to ask why.

That is a dangerous loss.


The Highest Good Without Religious Language?

Must one believe in God to learn from Aquinas?

Not necessarily.

One may read him in a secular way as a reminder that human life needs an orienting center. A “highest good” can mean that which gives unity and direction.

For some, that is God.
For others, truth.
For others, love of neighbor.
For others, responsibility.
For others, living honestly.

The central question is not what you call it. The question is whether you live without anything higher than momentary appetite.


Heidegger and the Call of Conscience

In Being and Time, Heidegger writes of the call of conscience—not as moral scolding, but as a quiet summons back to a more authentic life.

This becomes interesting when read beside Aquinas.

In Aquinas there is order and purpose.
In Heidegger there is calling and awakening.

Perhaps our age needs both:

  • a language of the good
  • a summons to live it


When Life Breaks Apart

What happens when illness, grief, or loss makes “the good life” seem impossible?

This is where every philosophy is tested.

A widow loses her partner.
A man receives a cancer diagnosis.
A child dies.
An old woman lives in loneliness.

At such moments, theories grow small.

Yet something may still remain:

goodness in presence
faithfulness
truth without decoration
courage to carry the day

Perhaps the highest good is sometimes not triumph, but love that remains standing in the dark.

Here Aquinas and existential thought meet more closely than many assume.


What Can We Learn Today?

From Thomas Aquinas:

  1. The good is more than preference.
  2. Human life has direction and purpose.
  3. Not all goods are equally important.
  4. Character and virtue matter.

From Heidegger:

  1. Human beings live in time and vulnerability.
  2. Systems can hide what matters most.
  3. We can lose ourselves in everydayness.
  4. Awakening is necessary.

From practical philosophy:

  1. Thought must become life.
  2. The good is often decided in small actions.
  3. Judgment matters more than slogans.
  4. Responsibility cannot be outsourced.


A Personal Reflection

Reading these older texts, I am struck by how modern we are—and how poor our thinking often becomes.

We have data about everything, but wisdom about little.
We measure well-being, but do not understand the soul.
We debate values, but rarely the good.

Perhaps we need not less philosophy, but more. Not more academic decoration, but more life-oriented thinking.

To read Heidegger reading Thomas Aquinas is therefore not antiquarian work. It is to recover questions we still live from.


Closing

What is the good?

The question returns when we least expect it: beside a hospital bed, in divorce, in parenting, in silence after harsh words, in the dawn when a person senses life must be lived more truthfully.

Thomas Aquinas reminds us that human beings seek fulfillment.
Heidegger reminds us that we can lose our way.

Practical philosophy begins when we take both truths seriously.

Not by speaking most about the good.
But by choosing it.
In small things.
In difficult things.
Today.


References

Aquinas, T. (1947). Summa theologica (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Trans.). Benziger Bros. (Original work published 1265–1274)

Aristotle. (2004). Nicomachean ethics (R. Crisp, Trans.). Cambridge University Press.

Heidegger, M. (1978). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Blackwell. (Original work published 1927)

Heidegger, M. (2006). Gesamtausgabe Band 23: Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis Kant. Vittorio Klostermann.

MacIntyre, A. (2007). After virtue (3rd ed.). University of Notre Dame Press.

Pieper, J. (1966). The four cardinal virtues. University of Notre Dame Press.

Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self. Harvard University Press.


This text and the illustration were made in conversation with OpenAI/ChatGTP

Thursday, April 23, 2026

What Is a Human Being?

 

What Is a Human Being?

A Kierkegaardian Reflection for Our Time

We live in an age that can measure almost everything.

We count heartbeats, calories, income, productivity, intelligence, risk, and performance. We classify personalities, diagnose disorders, optimize habits, and track sleep through glowing screens beside our beds.

Yet amid all this knowledge, one of the oldest and deepest questions often fades into the background:

What is a human being?

We speak constantly about people, but rarely pause to ask what a person truly is.

Perhaps that silence is not accidental. It is easier to measure than to understand. Easier to classify than to encounter. Easier to describe others than to examine oneself.

Here, across the distance of nearly two centuries, Søren Kierkegaard still speaks with surprising force.



What is a Human Beiing?


The Courage to Begin with Ignorance

In Philosophical Fragments, writing through his pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard makes a playful but profound proposal: let us assume that we know what a human being is.

The irony is clear.

We do not know.

Or rather: we know many things about human beings, yet remain uncertain about the human being as such.

In this, Kierkegaard stands close to Socrates. Socrates disturbed his own age because he questioned what others took for granted. He exposed false certainty and insisted that wisdom begins in the honest admission of not knowing.

That remains difficult for every generation.

We prefer answers. We admire confidence. We reward those who speak as if everything were already settled.

Yet the question of the human being does not open through certainty. It opens through humility.

Sometimes the most intelligent sentence is still:

I do not yet know.


More Than a Category

Modern societies often understand people through categories.

Citizen. Consumer. Patient. Employee. Voter. Case number. User profile.

These descriptions may contain truth, but none of them reaches the center.

A human being is more than a role, more than a social function, more than data gathered in a file. Something in us exceeds every label.

Kierkegaard saw this clearly. He was suspicious of crowds, abstractions, and systems whenever they swallowed the individual person. He believed that truth becomes deepest not in the mass, but in inwardness—in the life actually lived.

This does not mean selfish isolation. It means that no system can live your life for you.

No theory can suffer for you.

No institution can choose for you.

At decisive moments, existence becomes personal.


“A Human Being Is an Existing Being”

Kierkegaard offers a deceptively simple answer: a human being is an existing being.

At first glance, this may seem obvious. Of course human beings exist.

But Kierkegaard means something more demanding.

To exist is not merely to be present biologically. It is to stand within time, freedom, uncertainty, responsibility, hope, regret, love, anxiety, mortality, and possibility.

A stone is.

A tree grows.

But a human being must in some sense become.

We are given life, but not finished form.

We arrive incomplete.

And that incompleteness is not a flaw. It is part of our dignity.


The Self as a Task

One of Kierkegaard’s most enduring insights is that the self is not simply something one possesses. The self is also something one must become.

This is very different from modern slogans about “creating yourself” as if identity were a branding project.

We do not create ourselves from nothing.

We receive life, history, temperament, wounds, possibilities, limitations, relationships, and circumstances we did not choose.

Yet within what is given, a freedom appears.

How shall I relate to what I have been given?

Will I live second-hand, shaped only by expectation and fear?

Will I disappear into imitation?

Will I betray what I inwardly know?

Or will I gradually become more truthful?

This is the drama of the self.


Anxiety: The Price of Freedom

Kierkegaard’s reflections on anxiety remain startlingly modern.

He did not treat anxiety simply as pathology. He saw in it a revelation: anxiety discloses freedom.

When we realize that we can choose, change, begin again, disappoint others, disappoint ourselves, speak honestly, remain silent, love, withdraw, commit, or flee—anxiety often follows.

Freedom can feel dizzying.

Many people therefore prefer necessity.

They prefer routines they secretly resent, identities that no longer fit, expectations imposed by others, or habits that deaden inward life.

To remain trapped may feel safer than to become free.

Yet anxiety can also become a teacher.

It may be the trembling that accompanies the birth of a more truthful life.


Despair in Successful Times

Kierkegaard uses the word despair in a deeper sense than ordinary sadness.

Despair is not merely sorrow. It is a failure in relation to oneself.

A person may appear successful, admired, productive, even cheerful—and yet inwardly be estranged from the self.

One may live efficiently while living falsely.

One may gain the world and quietly lose inward ground.

This is not only a nineteenth-century problem.

It may be one of the central conditions of modern life.

Many today are exhausted not simply because they work too much, but because they live too far from themselves.


To Lose Oneself and Find Oneself

There is a paradox in all mature human growth.

To become oneself, one often has to lose oneself first.

One may need to lose borrowed ambitions.
Lose the need to impress.
Lose inherited masks.
Lose the identity built entirely on pleasing others.
Lose the illusion of control.

Only then can something quieter and more solid emerge.

This process is rarely dramatic. More often it happens slowly.

Through suffering.
Through failure.
Through love.
Through age.
Through solitude.
Through honest conversation.
Through the gradual exhaustion of falsehood.

Then a person sometimes says, after many years:

I am finally becoming myself.


What Our Time Forgets

Every age forgets something essential.

Our age risks forgetting that a human being cannot be reduced to metrics.

We know how to rank, compare, market, predict, and optimize. We are less certain how to listen, how to suffer meaningfully, how to stand alone, how to become inwardly free.

We are surrounded by information, yet often starved for wisdom.

Kierkegaard reminds us that the deepest human questions are not solved by accumulation of facts.

They are lived.

What is love?
What is courage?
What is despair?
What is faithfulness?
What is freedom?
What is a self?

These cannot be downloaded.

They must be wrestled with.


The Human Being as Relation

Kierkegaard describes the self as a relation that relates itself to itself.

This difficult phrase contains real insight.

We are beings who can turn toward ourselves.

We remember ourselves. Judge ourselves. Hide from ourselves. Forgive ourselves. Misunderstand ourselves. Reconcile with ourselves.

We can become divided inwardly.

But we can also become integrated.

This inner relation is part of what makes human life both difficult and profound.

A human being is not merely something observed from outside.

A human being is also an inward conversation.


A More Hopeful View

Yet Kierkegaard is not simply severe. He is also a thinker of hope.

If the self can be lost, it can also be found.

If one has lived falsely, one may begin more truthfully.

If despair exists, renewal exists.

If fear imprisons, courage can still awaken.

The unfinished nature of the human being is therefore not only burden. It is possibility.

As long as life remains, something remains open.


So, What Is a Human Being?

No final formula will suffice.

But perhaps we may say this:

A human being is a creature who must become what he or she already, in some hidden sense, is.

A being suspended between limitation and possibility.

A self called to truth.

A freedom that can be misused or deepened.

A life that cannot be fully explained from the outside.

A question that each person must answer by living.


Closing Reflection

Perhaps the danger of modern culture is not that we know too little about the human being.

Perhaps it is that we too quickly think we know enough.

Kierkegaard and Socrates still offer another path: begin again with wonder.

Ask the old question without embarrassment.

What is a human being?

Not a machine.
Not a statistic.
Not a role.
Not a possession.

But a self in the making.

And perhaps wisdom begins the moment we recognize that this work is never fully finished.


References 

Søren Kierkegaard Kierkegaard, S. (1985). Philosophical fragments (H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong, Trans.). Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1844)

Søren Kierkegaard Kierkegaard, S. (1980). The sickness unto death (H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong, Trans.). Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1849)

Søren Kierkegaard Kierkegaard, S. (1987). Either/Or, Part II (H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong, Trans.). Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1843)

Socrates Plato. (2002). Five dialogues (G. M. A. Grube, Trans.). Hackett.



The text is mine with input from OpenAI/ChatGPT, which also created the illustration