Saturday, April 18, 2026

On the Limits of Forgiveness

 On the Limits of Forgiveness

Here I would like to draw attention to conversations I had twenty years ago (in the early 1990s) with a young woman aged twenty-six. Our conversations lasted for more than two years. Of the hundreds of women and men exposed to sexual abuse whom I have spoken with, I believe this woman made the deepest impression on me.

Why?

I think it had to do with the way our conversations confronted me with the meaning of shame. Not her shame—for she carried herself with her head held high—but my own shame. I felt ashamed of being a man after hearing her story, and this led me to reflect deeply on my own understanding of masculinity, and more broadly on power, gender, and sexuality in our society.


Meaning appears between voices.

Abuse and violence are, to a large extent, male phenomena (Sætre et al., 1986; Andersen, 1998), and she made me wonder whether many of the conversations I had previously held with both perpetrators and victims had, in one way or another, also been about this.

My shame forced me to reconsider my self-image as a man. These conversations became one of the reasons I later chose to write my PhD dissertation on shame and sexual abuse.

Anthony Giddens (1997) distinguishes between guilt and shame. While guilt concerns the anxiety that arises when the boundaries of conscience are crossed, shame concerns failing to live up to one’s own ideals. My ideal image of what it means to be a man is part of what I strive to become. Shame was directly connected to that ideal image—my sense of self—and to how I wished to live my life.

In this sense, Giddens argues that regarding problems of self-identity, shame may be even more significant than guilt. The opposite of shame is pride, and it was precisely my masculine pride that I was forced to see in a new light through these conversations.

Her attitude toward guilt and forgiveness also made a profound impression on me.

To speak of forgiveness in relation to abuse is to enter a minefield. Many feel reluctant even to raise the subject. In many ways, it becomes a non-topic. Many would argue that abusers should not and cannot be forgiven. What they have done is unforgivable. They deserve punishment—not help, not therapy, not forgiveness.

Often I have seen perpetrators rejected by helping institutions on the grounds that priority must be given to victims rather than offenders. Many would understand such a position.

Yet this woman spoke of forgiveness in a way that left me silent.

That is what I wish to reflect upon here.


She told me that as an infant she suffered from Celiac disease, which caused severe nutritional difficulties. The illness was not diagnosed until she was close to death from malnutrition at the age of one.

She also had Cerebral palsy, though this was not properly diagnosed until she was eighteen. She said she had lived with bodily pain for as long as she could remember.

At school she was bullied because she often fell. Teachers became angry with her because of coordination problems, such as difficulty holding a pencil. She also struggled to express herself verbally.

She felt she was treated as a difficult child throughout her early school years.

Later she was wrongly diagnosed as intellectually disabled and placed in a special school for children with learning difficulties. There, for the first time in her life, she experienced recognition from both teachers and fellow pupils—for who she truly was, or at least seemed to be.

She looked back on this misdiagnosis as a rescue from a brutal everyday life in a sick society.

It should also be said that she later became a qualified preschool teacher with specialist competence in working with vulnerable children.


She had always been known as “Daddy’s girl.” He tied her shoelaces, helped her dress, comforted her when she fell, read to her, and let her sit on his lap.

So it did not seem unnatural to the family that, at the age of nine, she slept in the same bed as her father when they stayed overnight with friends.

That was when the sexual abuse began.

It continued for several years.

Her father, in a sense, had ownership over her, and no one questioned it. Everyone was simply pleased that he cared for her. She did anything she could to please him and to gain his recognition.


Fifteen years had passed since the abuse first began when she came to speak with me.

For those fifteen years she had “forgotten” the abuse, but suddenly the memories returned, and she needed help dealing with the emotions that overwhelmed her.

One of the first things she said was:

“I feel terribly sorry for Dad. What he did to me was horrible and dreadful, but he has taken all the blame and is trying to make things right.”

She had confronted her father one month earlier.

She refused to report him to the police because:

“He has taken the whole burden of guilt, and that is no light burden. I respect him for that. If I carry all of this inside me, it will destroy me and hinder me through the years. I do not want that. So I take the difficult road and try to forgive him—not forget what he did—but forgive. When he has taken the punishment, then the punishment is done.”

I asked what punishment she meant.

She replied:

“Not prison... but the guilt he has taken upon himself when he says he cannot live with what he has done. That must be the worst punishment there is. That guilt.”


There I sat before a young woman who had endured a painful childhood and years of abuse, yet who said she was trying to forgive her father.

I struggled both to understand and to accept it.

So I asked whether it was important for her to forgive him.

She answered:

“I think it is important to keep that goal before my eyes—that I shall manage it. There is much we do not understand, and much we can receive help with. But what we can do ourselves, we must do. What we cannot do, we must leave to God.”


What did she mean by forgiveness?

She said:

“I have connected forgiveness with continuing to love Dad and wanting him to be well with himself... that we might have as good a relationship as possible, despite what happened.”

She also believed he must eventually forgive himself:

“He deserves the guilt for a while. But then he must learn to forgive himself too... If he is to live with himself, he must find peace.”


Forgiveness here became something relational—something between a daughter and a father. Something he had to receive, and something she tried to give.

Paul Leer-Salvesen (1998), inspired by Martin Buber, writes that it is natural to speak of self-forgiveness, while forgiveness itself remains a phenomenon between an “I” and a “Thou.”

She also spoke of divine forgiveness. What she could not forgive herself, she entrusted to God.

Sometimes, she said, forgiveness is impossible for human beings—but not for God.


My client showed me that forgiveness exists as a phenomenon.

She spoke of it, reflected upon it, recognized its limits, and offered it.

Yet defining forgiveness remains difficult.

Perhaps impossible.

But the way forgiveness is spoken of in everyday language can be examined, and such reflection gives us a basis for thinking more deeply about it.

Forgiveness happens between persons. It is relational. It exists in relation to others, and in relation to oneself.

It also seems clear that repentance is often a condition for forgiveness. To forgive someone who shows no remorse is far less common.

Her father met his daughter face to face. He expressed sorrow. He asked forgiveness.

She stood upright.

He was broken.

Something had changed between them.


Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, speaks of virtue as a disposition—something one can strive toward and embody.

Forgiveness may involve such a disposition, but it is more than virtue.

It is both possibility and impossibility at once.

No one can demand unconditional forgiveness as if it were owed.

Leer-Salvesen, inspired by Knud Ejler Løgstrup, writes that forgiveness is better understood as a fundamental life-expression, always requiring interpretation.

Its place is the relationship itself.


Her interpretation of her father’s plea took place within a horizon of trust.

Her attempt to forgive reflected a desire for trust.

Yet trust broken by abuse can never simply be restored as though nothing happened.

The past cannot be erased.

She wished to forgive what was possible for her to forgive.

What was impossible, she entrusted to God.

This created at least the possibility of reconciliation.

Not innocence restored—but a different future.

I still find forgiveness remarkable.

I cannot define it fully.

Yet I have seen that it exists.

It is like standing before a mystery that fills one with silence.

A wonder that leaves one speechless.

And perhaps that is where the deepest truths often begin.


Nordic references used in this text

Andersen, Torbjørn H., 1998. Under en lukket himmel. Unge gutter utsatt for seksuelle overgrep i 
en kristen sjelesorgsammenheng. Vilkår for virkelighetsskaping og mestring
Aristoteles, 1996. Dewn Nikomakiske etikk. Oslo: Gyldendal.
Buber, Martin, [1923], 1990. Jag og Du. Ludvika: Dualis Forlag
Giddens, Anthony, 1997. Modernitet och självidentitet. Göteborg: Daidalos.
Leer-Salvesen, Paul, 1998. Tilgivelse. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Løgstrup, Knud Ejler, 1956. Den Etiske Fordring. København: Gyldendal.
Pettersen,Kaare Torgny, 2009: An Exploration into the Concept and Phenomenon of Shamewithin the Context of Child Sexual Abuse. An Existential-Dialogical Perspectiveof Social Work within the Settings of a Norwegian Incest Centre.  PhD 2009 Department of Social Work and HealthScience Faculty of Social Sciences and Technology Management. NorwegianUniversity of Science and Technology, NTNU, Trondheim, Norway. Doctoral theses 2009: 184
Sætre, Marianne, Harriet Holter og Ellen Jebsen, 1986. Tvang til seksualitet. Oslo: Cappelen.


English references for further reading on foregivness

Hannah Arendt, H. (1958). The human condition. University of Chicago Press.

Martin Buber, M. (1970). I and thou (W. Kaufmann, Trans.). Scribner. (Original work published 1923)

Robert D. Enright, R. D. (2001). Forgiveness is a choice: A step-by-step process for resolving anger and restoring hope. American Psychological Association.

Judith Herman, J. L. (1992). Trauma and recovery: The aftermath of violence—from domestic abuse to political terror. Basic Books.

Everett L. Worthington Jr., E. L. (2006). Forgiveness and reconciliation: Theory and application. Routledge.

June Price Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral emotions and moral behavior. Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 345–372.

Jacques Derrida, J. (2001). On cosmopolitanism and forgiveness (M. Dooley & M. Hughes, Trans.). Routledge.

Miroslav Volf, M. (1996). Exclusion and embrace: A theological exploration of identity, otherness, and reconciliation. Abingdon Press.




This text was written by me

 

When Rhythm Carries Life

 

When Rhythm Carries Life

I have gradually become aware of something simple in my own life:
I go to bed at the same time each evening. I wake up at the same time each morning. I sleep well. I allow myself a short rest in the afternoon. And I drink my three cups of coffee—without restlessness, without any disturbance of sleep.

Morning has broken: In the quiet repetition of morning, life gathers itself.


From the outside, this may look like routine.
Perhaps even like rigidity.

But is it?

In RepetitionSøren Kierkegaard introduces a concept that sheds light on this question: repetition. Not as empty habit, but as something existentially necessary. He writes:

“Repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite directions…”
(Kierkegaard, 1843/1983, p. 131)

Without repetition, life dissolves into fragments. Yet repetition without inwardness becomes lifeless—a mere sequence of actions without meaning.

The question, then, is not whether we have routines,
but whether we inhabit them.

In a different, but related way, Martin Heidegger reflects on everyday life in Being and Time. He is critical of what he calls das Man—the anonymous “one” in which we lose ourselves:

“We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as ‘one’ takes pleasure…”
(Heidegger, 1927/1962, §27)

Here, routine becomes something unowned—something we simply drift along with.

And yet, Heidegger does not reject everyday life. Rather, he points toward the possibility of dwelling in it—of being present within the ordinary rhythms of existence. To be human is not to escape repetition, but to find a way of being at home within it.

There is an old image from another world.
In ancient Egypt, the rising of the sun was bound to divine order. The god Ra journeyed through darkness each night to rise again at dawn. The pharaoh did not simply rule a people—he was seen as a guarantor of the order that made the sun’s return possible.

The world held together because order was maintained.

From where we stand, this may sound like myth.
And yet, there is something in it that still speaks.

This morning, the light returned once again.
Not because I commanded it.
Not because I held the world together.

But because the world, in its own way, continues.

Between Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and this ancient image, a quiet question emerges:

Is repetition something that empties life—or gives it form?
Are routines expressions of unfreedom—or conditions for freedom?

In my own life, the answer is not abstract.

The rhythm I live in does not feel like a constraint.
It feels like a kind of support.

It allows space for rest, for thought, for attention.
It holds the day together without closing it.

Perhaps this is where practical philosophy begins—
not in grand theories,
but in the texture of lived experience.

And perhaps, in the end, the question is not:

Do I live in routines?

But:

Do these rhythms allow me to become present in my own life?


References 

Kierkegaard, S. (1983). Repetition (H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong, Trans.). Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1843)

Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Harper & Row. (Original work published 1927)



I have written the text and created the illustrations in a morning conversation with OpenAI/ChatGTP 

Friday, April 17, 2026

Dignity – The Quiet Foundation of Our Humanity

 

Dignity – The Quiet Foundation of Our Humanity

There are moments in life and work that stay with us.

Not because they were dramatic,
but because something essential was at stake —
in the way one human being met another.

In my years in child welfare, I have carried many such moments with me.
Encounters where something in a person either opened… or closed.

And over time, one question has followed me:

What does it mean to meet another human being with dignity?


What does it mean to meet another human being with dignity?


This question is not abstract.

It lives in everyday encounters — in families, in professional practice, in conflicts, and in the fragile moments where people feel seen… or unseen.

In this reflection, I find inspiration in the work of Donna Hicks, whose “dignity model” emerges from decades of experience in international conflict mediation. Her work reminds us of something both obvious and easily forgotten:

Every human being has dignity — not as something earned, but as something inherent.

And yet, we constantly violate it.


The Difficult Distinction

One of the most challenging insights is this:

We must distinguish between the person and their actions.

A person always deserves dignity.
An action does not necessarily deserve approval.

This sounds simple — but in practice, it is profoundly difficult.

When someone harms another, our immediate reaction is often to withdraw respect. But if we do that, we risk entering a spiral where indignity produces more indignity.

I have seen this in families.
In child welfare.
In professional settings.
And in society at large.

The pattern repeats itself:
When dignity is denied, something in the human being closes.


When Dignity Is Violated

In social work, we meet people whose dignity has been deeply wounded.

Sometimes through neglect.
Sometimes through violence.
Sometimes through subtle, repeated experiences of not being seen.

In such encounters, something important becomes clear:

Healing begins when a person is recognized again as a subject — not an object.

This is where Martin Buber becomes deeply relevant.

Buber describes two fundamental ways of relating:

  • I–It: where the other becomes an object
  • I–Thou: where the other is encountered as a living human being

A violation of dignity turns a person into an It.
Healing requires a movement back toward Thou.

But how do we make that movement?

Here, Hans-Georg Gadamer offers a quiet but important insight:
Understanding is not something we apply to another person — it is something that happens between us.

To understand is to risk oneself.
To remain open.
To allow the other person’s experience to challenge one’s own assumptions.

And perhaps this is where dignity begins to be restored:
not in explanation, but in genuine openness.


The Individual and the Demand

Yet there is another dimension — more inward, more demanding.

Søren Kierkegaard reminds us that each human being stands as a single individual, called to take responsibility for how we live and how we meet others.

Dignity is not only something we give.
It is also something we must choose to uphold, even when it is difficult.

Especially when it is difficult.

To meet another person with dignity when they have hurt us
is not a natural reaction.

It is an ethical decision.

A decision that reveals something about who we are becoming.


The Elements of Dignity

Donna Hicks outlines ten elements of dignity. Rather than treating them as a checklist, I read them as reminders of how we ought to be present with others:

  • To accept another’s identity without reducing them
  • To include rather than exclude
  • To create safety — both physical and psychological
  • To truly listen and acknowledge
  • To recognize the value in others
  • To act with fairness
  • To trust rather than suspect
  • To seek understanding
  • To empower
  • And to take responsibility when we fail

These are not abstract principles.
They are small, concrete acts — repeated over time.


Ubuntu – We Become Human Together

There is an old idea, expressed in the African concept of Ubuntu:

“A person is a person through other persons.”

Dignity is not something we carry alone.
It is something that is given, received, and sustained in relationship.

Here, Ubuntu, Buber, and Gadamer meet:

  • In Buber’s I–Thou
  • In Gadamer’s understanding as dialogue
  • In the lived experience that we become human with and through one another


A Personal Reflection

Looking back on my own years in child welfare, I have seen how easily dignity can be overlooked — especially when behavior is difficult, chaotic, or even harmful.

But I have also seen something else:

When a person is met with dignity, even in the midst of conflict or failure, something shifts.

Not always immediately.
Not always visibly.

But something opens.

Perhaps this is where practical philosophy begins —
not in abstract theory,
but in the way we meet another human being.


Closing

To treat another person with dignity is not a technique.
It is a choice.

A quiet, demanding, and deeply human choice.

And perhaps, in the tension between
openness (Gadamer),
relation (Buber),
and responsibility (Kierkegaard),

we begin to understand what dignity truly asks of us.


References

Martin Buber
Buber, M. (1970). I and Thou (W. Kaufmann, Trans.). Charles Scribner’s Sons. (Original work published 1923)

Hans-Georg Gadamer
Gadamer, H.-G. (2004). Truth and method (2nd rev. ed., J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, Trans.). Continuum. (Original work published 1960)

Søren Kierkegaard
Kierkegaard, S. (1985). Works of love (H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong, Trans.). Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1847)

Donna Hicks
Hicks, D. (2011). Dignity: The essential role it plays in resolving conflict. Yale University Press.



I have written the text with a few suggestions from OpanAI/ChatGTP which also made the illustrations 

Violence as a Political Project

 Violence as a Political Project

Power, powerlessness—and our responsibility to act

There are times when violence no longer feels distant. It appears closer—more ordinary—almost woven into everyday life.

This reflection grows out of such a concern.

Inspired by Hannah Arendt, John Lundstøl, and others, I want to suggest something simple, yet demanding:

Violence is not only an individual problem.
It is also a political one.

 



When violence becomes culture

I recall the debate around Crash. Some cinemas refused to show it. Others insisted it must be shown in the name of freedom.

The disagreement pointed to something deeper:

Where does critique end—and where does fascination begin?

Violence is not only something we do.
It is also something we imagine.

And what we repeatedly imagine, we may slowly begin to accept.

 

A violent inheritance

History reminds us that violence is not an exception.

The last centuries have brought war, extermination, and systematic destruction on a massive scale—often carried out by ordinary people within organized systems.

This is perhaps the most unsettling truth:

Violence is human.

And yet, it remains something we must continuously resist and understand.

 

From lifestyle to social suffering

In postwar Norway, we learned that political action could change harmful patterns. Lifestyle diseases were addressed through laws, campaigns, and collective effort.

Something worked.

Today, we face something different:

  • violence
  • abuse
  • social fragmentation

Even in a peaceful society, many children grow up with neglect, instability, or fear.

These are not isolated problems.

They reflect something in the way we live togethe

 

Power and violence

Here, Hannah Arendt offers a crucial distinction:

Power and violence are not the same.

Power arises when people act together.
Violence, by contrast, is instrumental—it relies more on tools than on people.

And the difference matters:

Where power is present, violence becomes unnecessary.
Where violence dominates, it often reveals powerlessness.



 

When action disappears

We often describe modern society as free. Yet many experience something else: a loss of influence over their own lives.

When the ability to act is weakened, something can take its place.

Violence.

Not always in dramatic forms—but in everyday life, in language, in relations.

Violence becomes a distorted form of action.

 

A different response

Some years ago, young people attempted to burn the home of an immigrant family in a Norwegian municipality.

The response could have been limited to punishment.

Instead, the mayor invited the community to gather. People came. They spoke. They listened. They took responsibility together.

Something changed.

This is power in its most meaningful sense:

People acting together.

No violence was needed—because power had been restored.

 

Rage—and the possibility of change

Violence often grows out of rage.

But rage is not simply irrational. It arises when people experience that something is wrong—and could be changed—but is not.

This makes violence a political question.

If we want to reduce it, we must take seriously the conditions that produce it:

  • exclusion
  • humiliation
  • lack of voice

Control and punishment alone are not enough.

What matters is whether people experience themselves as actors in their own lives.

 



A closing reflection

In my years in child welfare, I have often seen that violence does not grow from strength, but from vulnerability.

And I have seen something else:

When people are met with dignity—and given the possibility to act—something shifts.

Perhaps this is where practical philosophy begins.

Not in abstract answers,
but in a simple question:

How do we create a society where people can act—without needing violence?

 

References

Arendt, H. (1970). On violence. Harcourt, Brace & World.
Lundstøl, J. (1992). Den autoritative mann. Universitetsforlaget.
Skjørten, K. (1994). Voldsbilder i hverdagslivet. Universitetsforlaget.
Storr, A. (1968). Human destructiveness. Penguin.



I have written the text and ChatAI/GPT has tightened it slightly for me and also made the illustrations.